*
A Hebrew translation of this paper was presented by the Israel Beiteinu party
to the Knesset Law Committee in July 1999.
______________________________________________________________________________
T |
o show why Israel needsЧand
desperately needsЧa constitution, it will be necessary to expose the fatal
flaws inherent in her present form of government.а Before doing so, let us anticipate objections that any
proposed constitution may arouse at this moment in IsraelТs history.
It may first be
said that Israel is so faction-ridden that a constitution, however desirable,
is utterly impractical.а The religious
parties, or so it seems, will especially be opposed to a constitution since
they identify the latter with ultra-secular attempts to separate religion and
state.а Moreover, so imminent are the
dangers confronting Israel that to place a constitution on the public agenda
may be deemed a mischievous distraction.а
Hence the burden of justifying, let alone of implementing, a constitution
for the State of Israel in the present juncture of domestic and international
affairs appears insuperable.а
If it can be shown, however, that IsraelТs
political system is itself a fundamental cause of her internal crises and
external dangers, it would logically follow that Israel will not overcome her
precarious situation without drastically changing her system of
government.а Hence I contend that a
constitution comparable to the one proposed in this paperЧand it should appeal
to religious as well as non-religious JewsЧis essential to IsraelТs
salvation.а But first, let us understand
why Israel has no constitution.
*а *а *
A. The Failure of a Constituent Assembly
C |
ontrary to a widespread
prejudice, IsraelТs religious parties did not oppose a constitution when the
State was formed in 1948.а IsraelТs
Declaration of Independence, which prescribes a constitution, was signed by
four rabbis.а IsraelТs Provisional
Government arranged for the election of a Constituent Assembly to draft a
constitution.а A committee composed of
various party spokesmen was elected.а A
draft constitution was submitted to the Committee by Dr. Leo Kohn.а The draft was supported by spokesmen of
Agudat Israel, Mizrachi, and Ha-Poel
MizrachiЧthe religious parties.а
However, the committeeТs majority, representing Mapai and Mapam, the
secular parties, rejected the proposed Constitution on two grounds.а
First, the draft
provided that the President of the State shall be Jewish.а Secularists feared that such a provision
would be deemed УracistФ by the international community, even though the
Declaration repeatedly refers to Israel as a Jewish State.а
Second, the draft prescribed that the
legislation of the State shall be based on the fundamental principles of Jewish
law, which shall guide the courts in filling gaps in the existing British
Mandatory law.а Opponents argued that
there is no assurance that Jewish law provides a ready solution for various
problems of the new state, and that the vast majority of lawyers and judges
lack sufficient knowledge of Jewish law for answers to the problems that might
arise.аа
Former Deputy
President of the Supreme Court, Professor Menachem Alon, questions the validity
of these arguments.аа The draft merely
proposed recourse to Jewish law when there is a gap in existing law, Уwhich, in
the nature of things, will probably occur in few cases, since the vast majority
of legal questions are answered by the StateТs current law.Фаа Besides, Уrecourse to English law is not to
a clear and explicit code, but to case law, which is voluminous, obscure, and
scattered throughout different legal sources.а
Moreover, access to these English-language sources is far from
convenient for the overwhelming majority of Israeliа citizens, who have a right to know what the law of the State
provides.а Even Israeli lawyers,Ф said
Alon, Уexperience the same difficulties with English precedents.Фааа
So much for the
reasons why Israel does not have a constitution.а We need only reiterate the fact that, contrary to common opinion,
the religious parties were not initially adverse to a written
constitution.а To be sure, opposition is
now expressed by various religionists; but whether they would reject the
constitution outlined below (and personally elucidated by its author)
remains to be seen.
*а *а *
Not only did the
Constituent Assembly fail to adopt a constitution, but it appointed itself as
the first Knesset!а The Knesset
proceeded to assume absolute power, at least in theory.а In fact, however, the Knesset delegated
virtually unlimited power to the Government, i.e., the Cabinet.а The power of the Government is virtually
unlimited precisely because the People of Israel have been arbitrarily deprived
of a constitutional foundation for limited government.а The People were never properly consulted
about IsraelТs system of government.а
They have tacitly consented to that system because they believeЧand they
have been educated to believeЧthat the present system is democratic.а Such a belief has no solid theoretical or
empirical foundation.
B. Popular
Sovereignty?
D |
emocracy literally means
the rule of the people or popular sovereignty, which reduces to the rule of the
majority.а Majority rule requires
political equality, more precisely, universal suffrage or one adult/one
vote.а Universal suffrage exists in
Israel.а Democracy also requires
political freedom, the freedom to form political parties and compete in
periodic elections for the control of the Government.а Such freedom exists in Israel.а
I will nonetheless argue that despite universal suffrage, popular
sovereignty does not exist in Israel, except on one day in roughly four
years.аа I will also show how the lack
of popular sovereignty renders Israeli politicians less capable of resisting
international pressure.а Indeed, we
shall see that how Israeli politicians react to such pressure depends not
only on their own moral and intellectual character but also on the character of
IsraelТs political institutions, a factor ignored by other
commentators.
ааааааааааа Former Prime Minister Benjamin NetanyahuТs Cabinet
consisted of no less than seven parties each with its own agenda.а Even a wiser and more dauntless person would
have found it virtually impossible to pursue a coherent, resolute, and
long-term national strategy.а As is
well-known, this medley of parties, which renders the Cabinet a collection of
fiefdoms, is the result of IsraelТs parliamentary system of proportional
representation based on an electoral threshold of a mere 1.5 percent.а Only the Netherlands (a homogeneous country)
has a lower threshold among some fifty countries using proportional
representation.а What is more, Israel
is the only reputed democracy that employs fixed party lists without
constituency elections.а This is
a formula for party dictatorship.а Party
dictatorship not only contradicts popular sovereignty, but, strange as it may
seem, it diminishes IsraelТs independence vis-à-vis her patron, the
United States.а Let me explain.
ааааааааааа Assume that the leader of party A is IsraelТs
Prime Minister, and that the leaders of parties, B, C, D
and E are his Cabinet MinistersЧa typical Israeli concoction.а Because a majority of the KnessetТs members (MKs)
owe their position and perquisites to these parties and not to the votes of
constituents, they cannot function as judges of their GovernmentТs policies as
do legislators in all democratic countries.а
If an MK were to vote against his Government he would be committing
political suicide.а This will inhibit
him from resisting policies he deems unwise or dangerous.а He will then be less able to resist the same
foreign pressure prompting his Government to pursue that questionable
policy.а Meanwhile, because the voters
have no individual Knesset Member accountable to them, whom they could then
expect to uphold their basic interestsЧwhich may well be opposed to the
GovernmentТs foreign policyЧthey themselves, the voters, will become unduly
sensitive and more subservient to Уworld opinion.Ф
Therein is a
hitherto unnoticed reason why Israeli governmentsЧno longer in the youth
ofа ZionismЧhave yielded to the American
State DepartmentТs post-Six Day War policy of Уterritory for peace,Ф contrary
to the deepest convictions of a large majority of IsraelТs Jewish population.а If this majorityТs convictions on the
territorial issue have since been eroded, a basic cause is this: they
lack Knesset representatives of their own choosing.
ааааааааааа Let us recall the 1992 Knesset electionsЧthe elections
that brought Labor to power.а Labor,
attentive to overwhelming public opinion reported by professional polls,
promised No withdrawal from the Golan, No negotiation with the
PLO, No Palestinian state, and No negotiation over
Jerusalem.аа These were not campaign
promises about taxes and health care but about the very borders and capital of
the State.а Once in office, however, the
Government literally scorned public opinion.а
As for the Knesset, it was controlled by the ruling party coalition in
the Cabinet.
ааааааааааа Again, shortly after NetanyahuТs election in 1996, he
boasted that Уno oneФ expected him to meet with Yasir Arafat, that Уno oneФ
expected him to use Oslo as the basis of the peace process, and that Уno oneФ expected
him to withdraw from Hebron.а This
clearly implies that those who voted for Netanyahu in 1996 opposed such a
policy, which means he too disregarded the convictions of those who made him
Prime Minister.а As for the Knesset, it
remains a cipher.а And so, as indicated
earlier, popular sovereignty in Israel is king only for a day.
Strange as it
may seem, nothing so weakens this country as the absence of a Legislature
independent of the Executive, one whose members are directly accountable to the
votersа (and not simply to a party or
its central committee).а Precisely
because a Prime Minister may lack the courage to resist foreign pressure, an
independent legislature is necessary to compensate for his frailty either by
the threat of decisive opposition to his foreign policy, or, conversely, by
rallying to his support to neutralize intimidation from abroad.
It follows that
a weak Legislature does not necessarily make for a strong Executive in foreign
affairs, and IsraelТs legislature is pathetically weak.а Although the Knesset can topple the
Government by a vote of no confidence, the only time such a thing has happened
was in 1990, and then only as a result of party defections in a Government of
National Unity!а Such is the unchecked
power of the Executive in relation to the people and the Knesset, that it can
conclude agreements with foreign states and even with criminal organizations
without public debate and even without serious Knesset debate.а Whatever one thinks of the September 1993
Oslo or Israel-PLO Agreement, the fact remains that it was ratified on the
White House lawn.а Indeed, unknown to
the Knesset, the Rabin-Peres Government secretly agreed to yield eastern
Jerusalem to the PLO contrary to various Israeli statutes, including the 1980 Basic
Law:а Jerusalem, Capital of Israel.а а
Meanwhile, the
Supreme CourtТs power to adjudicate suits challenging the legality of
Government decisions on such potent foreign policy issues has no established
constitutional basis.а On the other
hand, the impotence of the Knesset has encouraged the Supreme Court to assume
the powers of a super legislature, especially on religious issues.а The CourtТs Уjudicial activismФ has aroused
criticism not only from of the religious, but from former Supreme Court judges
as well as from politicians and academics across the political spectrum.а The lack of a constitution with effective
institutional checks and balances in Israel renders the Court as well as the
Government above the law.а But even
members of IsraelТs inept Knesset violate the law with impunity, and thus make
a mockery of democracy.а Suffice to
mention Arab MKs who not only consort with IsraelТs enemiesЧterrorist states
and various terrorist organizationsЧbut openly violate the law which prohibits
any party that negates the Jewish character of the State.
ааааааааааа The rule of law, a basic principle of democracy, hardly
exists in Israel, and precisely because the country lacks a constitution. аA constitution, understood as a fundamental
law superior to, and more enduring than, statute law, is a precondition of the
rule of law.а To be sure, no
constitutionЧnot even the TorahЧcan guarantee honest government and ensure its
efficient operation.а Nevertheless, a
well-designed constitution can increase the probability of
obtaining such a government.а It can
therefore facilitate the development of consistent, comprehensive, and resolute
national policies and thus contribute to national unity and security as well as
national dignity and prosperity.
Every sensible and unbiased
Jew, whether religious or not, will support such a constitution, provided he is
fairly confident that it will help remedy the manifest flaws of IsraelТs
existing form of government, while safeguarding his personal, civil, economic,
and religious rights.а No well-informed
and civic minded Jew can be happy with a parliamentary system which makes
Israel the only one of 75 democracies that lacks constituency elections!аа Surely he would prefer to vote for an
individual candidate familiar and accountable to him, rather than vote for an
obscure, self-perpetuating oligarchy, i.e., some party list that gives
politicians safe seats and enables them to ignore Jewish public opinion with
impunity.а Who can be content with a
parliamentary system whose 1.5 percent electoral threshold spawns political
parties like weeds, fills the Knesset with party-hopping job seekers, fosters
egotism and venality, fragments and paralyzes the Government, sullies public
life and undermines any sense of national purpose?а True, a constitution cannot of itself make men virtuous, but it
can mitigate rather than magnify their vices.а
ааааааааааа Let us be candid:а
Given the concentration yet fragmentation of power in the Cabinet,
Israel exemplifies, de jure, a dysfunctional oligarchyЧand I have not
mentioned the governmentТs ownership of most of the countryТs resources.а This oligarchy can metamorphose into a de
facto dictatorship when the Labor Party gains control of the government,
since Labor has always dominated the economy and mass media as well as the
countryТs educational and cultural institutions.а
This
overwhelming concentration of political-economic and opinion-making power in
the hands of IsraelТs interlocking elites offers no redress and no outlet for
rational and effective dissent or opposition between elections.а Hence it is hardly an exaggeration to
conclude that every four years or so the people of Israel exercise their
political freedom and then relapse into political servitude.
ааааааааааа Indeed, Israel has the worst of two worlds.а Her people not only live under an oligarchy,
but the oligarchy is dignified and thereby fortified by the veneer of
democracy, which renders the people of Israel all the more powerless.а Moreover, because Israel is perceived as a
democracy, her Government is expected by the democratic world to make
gratuitous concessions to Arab despots, indeed, to take Уrisks for peaceФ which
no democratic government would dare ask of its people.а IsraelТs form of government is a disaster.а
I |
f it be said democracy is inconsistent with Judaism, no less than Spinoza
would agree.а Spinoza, the father of
liberal democracy and of modern biblical criticism, deemed the Torah anything
but democratic.а Yet distinguished
rabbis and jurists contend that the two are consistent.а To resolve this contradiction, I shall
distinguish between two types of democracy, УcontemporaryФ and УclassicalФ
democracy.
Democracy has two basic principles, freedom and equality.а Whereas freedom, in contemporary
democracy, means Уliving as you like,Ф equality legitimates all
Уlife-styles.Фа This is why moral
equivalence and hedonism now permeate democratic societies.а Hence one may ask:а УWhat is there about democratic freedom that would prompt youth
to restrain their passions, to be kind, honest, and just?а What is there about democratic equality that
would prompt a person to defer to wisdom or show respect for teachers or
parents?Фа
In contrast, classical democracy derives freedom and equality
from the TorahТs conception of manТs creation in the image of God, which
provides freedom and equality with ethical and rational constraints.а Recall the American Declaration of
Independence.а Since the Declaration
proclaims Уall men are created equal,Ф and refers to God as the УSupreme
Judge,Ф it follows that all are obligated to obey the laws of their
Creator (say the Seven Noahide Laws of Morality).а Admittedly, the Declaration emphasizes Уrights,Ф whereas the
Torah emphasizes Уobligations.Фа
Although the two are correlativeЧyour rights are my obligations, and vice-versaЧrights
connote Уtaking,Ф while obligations denote Уgiving.Фаа Still, if freedom is linked to obligation, and if equality is
construed as an elevating and not a leveling principle,
classical democracy can be assimilated to Judaism.а
Turning to IsraelТs Declaration of Independence, there the terms
Уpolitical equalityФ and УfreedomФ must be understood contextually.а By acknowledging IsraelТs raison
dТêtre as a Jewish State, such that its being УJewishФ is the
StateТs paramount principle, the Уpolitical equalityФ mentioned
in the Declaration must then be construed not as an absoluteЧthe tendency of
contemporary democracyЧbut as a logically subordinate principle.а Consider, too, the DeclarationТs avowal that
the Jewish State will be based on Уfreedom Е as envisioned by the prophets of
Israel.Фа Any intelligent and honest
person, even if not religious, will admit that the prophetsТ understanding of
freedom differs from the normless freedom of contemporary
democracy.а For the prophets, only those
who obey the laws of God are truly free.а
If we take the prophets seriouslyЧrecall how they admonish kings and
denounce immoralityЧwe may learn how to elevate democracy and render it
compatible with a Jewish constitution.
A |
ny constitution that separates religion and state is rooted in the
Christian doctrine, УRender unto Caesar the things that are Caesars and unto
God the things that are GodТs.Фа This
doctrine severed Christianity from nationality and eventually
made religion a private matterн.а The
same doctrine influenced the First Amendment of the American Constitution,
which declares, УCongress shall make no law respecting the establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof ЕФа This clause is now misunderstood.аа It was intended not to prevent Congress from enacting laws
supportive of religion, but to prohibit Congress from establishing any state
or national religion.аа
AmericaТs founding fathers were not ultra-secularists.а They deemed support of religion essential to
national morality.а In his УFarewell
Address,Ф George Washington declared:а
УOf all the dispositions and habits which lead to political prosperity,
Religion and morality are indispensable supportsЕ. Whatever may be conceded to
the influence of refined education on minds of peculiar structure, reason and
experience both forbid us to
expect that National morality can prevail in the exclusion of religious
principle.Фа
Inasmuch as the
Уestablishment clauseФ of the First Amendment mandated institutional separation
of religion and state, and not the separation of the state from religious values,
a constitution may be designed for the Jewish State of Israel without severing
public law from Jewish values.а
For example, a
constitution can prescribe a legislature without specifying the content of any
law which the legislature may enact.а A
constitution, therefore, need not affect the scope of legislative power
presently exercised by IsraelТs Knesset.а
Also, a constitution can be silent about, or empower the legislature to
prescribeЧas has the KnessetЧvarious systems of jurisprudence, Jewish and
non-Jewish, leaving the judiciary to decide which is the most appropriate in a
given case.аа
On the other
hand, and as we shall propose, a constitution can explicitly acknowledge
IsraelТs raison dТêtre as a Jewish State, as stipulated in its
Declaration of Independence.а By
designating the State as УJewish,Ф that designation becomes the stateТs paramount
principle, in relation to which any other principle may be limited lest it
lead to the negation of the StateТs Jewish character.а As noted above, Israeli law prohibits any party that negates the
Jewish character of the State.а This law
obviously limits the principle of political equality prescribed in the
Declaration of Independence, a logical as well as necessary limitation given
the StateТs raison dТêtre.
Finally, a
constitution can be designed as an educational as well as a legal document.а Thus conceived, a constitution can render its prescribed system
of government more comprehensible to laymen.а
It can thus facilitate government by the consent of the governed, a
principle of Jewish lawн.а If citizens
are to influence the laws affecting their lives, they must have adequate
knowledge of the general structure and purposes of the legislative, executive,
and judicial branches of government, something a concise constitution (like the
American) can provide for secular and religious students alike.а Such a constitution, more clearly and coherently
than IsraelТs uncertain, uncoordinated, and intermittent Basic Laws, can
delineate and interrelate the powers of government, define the basic rights and
duties of citizens, prescribe criteria by which to remove corrupt public
officials, and thereby promote public morality and the rule of law.
ааааааааааа Some religionists object to
a constitution saying, УWe have a constitution, the Torah.Фа It may be argued, however, that few
rabbinical leaders today are qualified to exercise the powers of government
prescribed in the Torah, and fewer still command the recognition of most Jews
in Israel.а With all due respect to
IsraelТs learned rabbis, how many fulfill the extraordinary qualifications of
the Sanhedrin?а The judges of that
supreme body, according to the fourteenth book of MaimonidesТ Mishneh Torah,
must not only be experts in the vast corpus of Jewish law, but well versed in
many branches of science, including astronomy, mathematics, logic, anatomy, and
medicine?аа All honor to IsraelТs
halakhic authorities, but would investing them with the legislative as
well as judicial powers of the Sanhedrin be acceptable to the majority of
IsraelТs Jewish populationЧas it must be according to Jewish law?аа Moreover, on what prominent Jew would the
people of Israel be willing to bestow the executive power and life tenure of a
king?а And where are the prophets who,
like those of old, admonished kings who strayed from the high standards of
Jewish law?а
Those who now
shun a constitution in the name of the TorahТs system of governance unwittingly
elevate the present generation as if it had risen to the heights of the
Torah!а Hence they fail to see that a
well-designed constitution may bring not only secular but many religious (!)
Jews closer to the Torah without derogating from the TorahТs ultimate
authority.
ааааааааааа In any event, a
Jewish Constitution requires institutions that can preserve the Jewish
character of the State as well as office-holders who are not only loyal to the
State, but knowledgeable about Jewish history, beliefs, and values.а Such qualifications guided those who
designed the Constitution of the Republic of Ireland.а To preserve their peopleТs cultural heritage, they established a
bicameral parliament whose upper house, the Senate, consists of 60 members, 49
of whom are elected from five panels of candidates having knowledge and
practical experience in the major sectors of public life, the first
being УNational Language and Culture, Literature, Art, Education and such
professional interests as may be defined by law for the purpose of this
panel.Фа
Surely a Jewish
Constitution should do no less.а But
first, let us consider its general structure and principles.
ааааааааааа
I |
sraelТs present system
of coalition cabinet government yields a plural and therefore inept
Executive.а If only because of this
countryТs precarious situation in the Middle East, a well-designed constitution
will prescribe unity in the Executive by means of a Presidential form of
government in which members of the Cabinet are freely chosen by the President
and share his basic convictions.а
The Parliament
should be bicameral.а While the function
of law-making will be assigned to the upper branch, the УSenate,Ф the function
of administrative scrutiny will be assigned to the lower branch, the УChamber
of Deputies.Фа To anticipate objections
to a second branch of Parliament without law-making power, let us compare it
with the existing Knesset.
We have seen
that the Knesset, in practice, it is little more than a rubber-stamp for the
Cabinet.а It does not legislate so much
as affirm legislation initiated by the coalition of party leaders heading the
cabinet ministries.а Subservient to the
Cabinet, the Knesset is incapable of exercising the important function of
administrative oversightЧwhich is why corruption in government is so
widespread in Israel.
Second, whereas
members of the Knesset are utterly dependent on their parties, members of the
proposed Chamber of Deputies will be accountable to their constituents.
Deputies will have a base of independent power, while constituents will have
their own representatives.а Since
Deputies will be excluded from the Cabinet, they will not be deterred from
scrutinizing the bureaucracy to see whether the laws are being faithfully and
efficiently administered.а This will
minimize corruption.
III.а A Draft Constitution
A.а The
Preamble
[It would be perverse
and ignominious that the People who gave mankind ethical monotheism should omit
reference to God in the Preamble of its Constitution when God is mentioned in
various constitutions of the democratic world.а
Hence the following is suggested.]
W |
e
the People of Israel, grateful to God for preserving us as a Nation and
for returning us to the Land of our Fathers, mindful of our sacred
responsibility to Mankind as the Torah-bearing Nation, dedicated to Truth,
Justice, and Peace, do solemnly establish this Constitution.а Accordingly, nothing in this Constitution is
to be construed as derogating from the Wisdom of our Prophets and Sages.а To the contrary, this Constitution is
intended to preserve the Jewish heritage and to hasten the day when Israel will
present the example of a Nation in which Freedom dwells with Righteousness,
Equality with Excellence, Wealth with Beauty, the here and now with Love of the
Eternal.
B.а Institutions of Government
The Senate
1. The Senate
shall be composed of [ ] members having a six-year tenure.аа One-third will be chosen every second year.
2.а To be eligible for membership in the Senate,
a person must have knowledge of` the Hebrew Bible, Jewish history and customs,
and Jewish literature, which knowledge must be certified by secular and/or
religious institutions of learning prescribed by law.
3.а For the purpose of electing Senators, the
country shall be divided into regions.а
The number of regions shall be prescribed by law.а The method of choosing Senators will be
based on the open [as opposed to the present closed] list PR system.[1]
4. The electoral
threshold shall be prescribed by law, but must be no less than five percent.
5.а A majority of the members of the Senate may,
by a petition addressed to the President, request the President to decline to
sign and promulgate as a law any Bill (other than those affecting defense and
appropriations) on the ground that it contains a provision of such national
importance that the will of the people thereon ought to be ascertained by a
national referendum.
6.а No treaty or agreement with any foreign
power or entity shall become law prior to twenty-one days after its submission
to the Senate.а One-third of the
SenateТs membership can prevent any treaty or agreement with a foreign power
from becoming law immediately, by setting it aside until the next senatorial
election.а Such a pending bill comes
into effect only if the new Senate, too, adopts it without changes after the
election.
7.а The Senate shall have the power to declare
war, provide for the common defense, and make all laws which shall be necessary
and proper to promote the welfare and dignity of the State of Israel.
The Chamber of Deputiesаааааа
1.а The Chamber of Deputies shall consist of
[а ] members having a tenure of four
years.а One-half shall be chosen every
two years.аа
2.а Deputes will be chosen in single-member
electoral districts.[2]
3.а The Chamber of Deputies will perform the
function of administrative oversight.а
Excepting classified security matters, it will inspect the various the
ministries, the army, and every institution or enterprise in which a State
authority participates, whether managerially or financially.а Inspection shall include accountancy,
legality, and appropriateness of the practices examined.
ааааааааааа 4.
The Chamber of Deputies will conduct public hearings, investigate public
complaints regarding the State administration, and suggest measures to remedy
any administrative shortcomings and abuses.а
[The ChamberТs investigatory powers render it a formidable body, as
would be appreciated by those familiar with the power wielded by any
investigating committee of the American Congress.]
ааааааааааа 5. The Chamber of Deputies may recommend legislation to
the Senate, which the Senate may amend or reject as it sees fit.а But if such recommendations are enacted into
law, their juridical authority will be derived from the action of the Senate.
аааа
The President
1.а The Executive power shall be vested in a
President.а The President shall hold
office for four years, and, together with a Vice-President chosen for the same
term, shall be chosen as follows:аааааа
ааааааааааа (a) Forty days prior to the
prescribed date for national elections, the Senate shall convene to nominate at
least two presidential candidates.а Any
group of 20 or more Senators may nominate a presidential (and vice-presidential)
candidate.
(b)
The names of the presidential candidates (and their respective
vice-presidential candidates) shall be placed on a national ballot.а The candidate receiving a majority of the
votes cast shall be President.а If no
candidate receives a majority, the two receiving the highest number of votes
shall compete in a run-off election.
2.а To retain the services of a wise and
experienced President, and to avoid the phenomenon of a Уlame-duckФ President,
he will be indefinitely eligible for re-election.а [This accords with the democratic principle of governmentа by the consent of the governed.]
ааааааааааа 3. The President shall recommend legislation to the
Senate, have the power, with the consent of the Senate, to make treaties, be
commander-in-chief of the Israel Defense Forces, and be responsible for the
administration of the laws.
4. The President
shall nominate the members of his Cabinet.а
The names shall be submitted to the Senate for confirmation by a
majority vote of the plenum.
5.а The President shall nominate the Judges of
the Supreme Court.а The names shall be
submitted to the Senate and will require confirmation by a three-fifts vote of
the plenum.
6.а The President will be subject to impeachment
for malfeasance of office by a two-thirds vote of a Senate plenum.
7.а The Vice-President shall preside over the
Senate and vote only in the event of a tie.
The Judiciary
1.а The judicial power shall be vested in a
nine-member Supreme Court and in such inferior courts which the Senate may from
time to time establish.
2.а The membership of the Supreme Court will
include at least three professorial and three rabbinical experts in Jewish law,
all of whom, however, must be knowledgeable of secular law.
ааааааааааа 3.а The Supreme
Court shall be the final interpreter of the Constitution, except as otherwise
provided by this Constitution.а However,
any law nullified by the Court will be submitted to a popular referendum.
4.а Among the diverse systems of
law operative in Israel, Jewish law shall be Уfirst among equalsФ in every case
where an Israeli statute is ambiguous or uncertain, except only where the
Israeli statute explicitly differs from Jewish law.а [This conforms to the Foundations of Law Act of 1980, which
provided:а УWhere a Court finds that a
legal issue requiring decision cannot be resolved by reference to legislation
or judicial precedent, or by analogy, it shall reach its decision in the light
of the principles of freedom, justice, equity, and peace of the Jewish
heritage.Ф]а
а5.а Questions
of personal status (e.g. marriage, divorce, and conversion) shall be decided
solely by Rabbinical Courts.
аA |
mendments to the Constitution shall require the approval of two-thirds of a
Senate plenum followed by a popular referendum requiring a two-thirds vote for
confirmation.
ааааааааааа
1. All elected
officials and civil servants shall duly affirm IsraelТs paramount
governing principle as a Jewish State
2. No person
holding office under the authority of Israel shall, during his tenure, be
eligible for any other public office, unless otherwise specified in this
Constitution.а Nor shall he be a member
of, or receive any emolument from, any profit-making enterprise, or appoint any
personnel employed therein.
ааааааааааа 3.а Election campaigns shall be confined to
thirty days and be financed solely by public funds.а Per capita expenditures for such campaigns will not exceed that
of other democracies.а Any expenditures
that exceed the statutory limitations will not be financed by subsequent
legislative appropriations.
ааааааааааа 4.а No person
shall vote in any national election unless he has been a resident of Israel for
two years.
ааааааааааа
E.аа
A Constitutional Bill of Rights
1.а The Land of Israel, of which the State is only
the custodian, belongs exclusively and eternally to the Jewish People.а Hence, except for public purposes defined by
law, the State shall foster private Jewish ownership and development of the
Land of Israel.
2.а Force majeure aside, no land under
IsraelТs sovereignty may be surrendered to any foreign power or entity.аааа
ааааааааааа 3.а No law of the
Senate, and no decision of the Supreme Court, shall be promulgated without due
respect for the abiding beliefs and prevailing practices of the Jewish
People.а
4. The right of
workers to strike is inviolable, except to the extent that it deprives the
community of its right to essential services.
5.а
No citizen of Israel living abroad shall be denied the right to vote in
elections for which he is qualified.а
6.а Citizens and residents of Israel will be
guaranteed freedom of religion and freedom of speech and press.ааа Citizens and residents of Israel shall
have the right to establish their own religious and educational institutions,
provided these are consistent with loyalty to the Jewish State.
7.а No citizen or resident of Israel shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived
of life, liberty, or due process of law.
8.а In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall
enjoy the right to counsel, to a speedy and public trial, to be informed of the
accusation for which he is been charged; to be confronted by witnesses against
him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to
have the assistance of counsel for his defense.
9.а The right of citizens and residents of
Israel to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.
10.а
The enumeration in this Constitution of certain rights shall not be
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the Jewish People or affirmed
by the Torah respecting Jews and non-Jews.
IV.а
Conclusions
T |
he above
constitutional provisions are tentative and by no means complete.а The modes of constituting the various
branches of government will have to be further elaborated, as will their
respective powers and procedures.а
Nevertheless, this proposed Constitution would:а (1) Enhance IsraelТs dignity; (2) facilitate
the wise formulation and execution of national policies; (3) elevate the moral
and intellectual character of Israeli politics; (4) enable the Government to
negotiate more effectively with foreign powers; and (5) promote Jewish unity
and Jewish national pride.
No Constitution
can be viable unless it is in harmony with the basic beliefs and practices of
the people for whom it is intended.а
Fortunately, the likelihood of popular approval of this Constitution may
be adduced from surveys of public opinion.а
A 1993 study
indicates that 55 percent of IsraelТs Jewish population believes in the divine
origin of the Torah, that 25 percent are observant, and that 55 percent are
traditional.а (According to a May 1997
report, during the previous six years, more than 200,000 Israelis became fully
observant, and some 130,000 said they had changed from a secular to a
traditional orientation.)а Also, of the
20 percent that identify themselves as Уsecularists,Ф 75 percent keep many
Jewish customs if only for family or nationalistic reasons.а Unsurprisingly, of the 120 members of the
Fifteenth Knesset, no less than thirty are Orthodox Jews.а
Most secularists
acknowledge the obvious fact that Israel cannot remain a Jewish State if its
laws as well as its system of education are severed from Judaism.а On the other hand, in reaction to the
ultra-orthodox, ultra-secularists wish to separate religion from the State, but
without being fully aware of the beneficial Jewish laws that have been
incorporated into IsraelТs legal system (e.g., the Wage Delay Prohibition Law,
the Severance Pay Law, the Prohibition of Defamation Law, and the Right to
Privacy Law).а
Actually, just
as there is ignorance about Jewish law among many secularists, so there is
ignorance about constitutions among many religionists.
аааа
If Israel is to
survive and prosper, Jews will have display toward each other greater
kindliness and humility.аа Surely the
proposed Constitution would greatly facilitate this happier state of affairs.а Without minimizing the obstacles to this
Constitution, let us bear in mind these words of a Jewish sage:
аУAsk not if a thing is possible; ask
only if it is necessary.Ф
*а *а *
[1] See Rein
Taagepera & Matthew S. Shugart, Seats and Votes (Yale University
Press, 1989), p. 25.а This system, which
is used in Finland, requires, Уeach voter to vote for one specific
candidateЕ.All the votes for candidates of a given party are totaled to
determine how many seats are awarded to the party, as if they were votes for a
list.а The seats are then filled
according to the relative number of votes gained by each candidate.а Thus there is no centrally mandated list
order for the candidates and more is left up to the voter, providing more
СpersonalТ representation than is the case in conventional list PR.Ф
An alternative,
preferred by many political scientists, is the Single Transfer Vote System
(STV) used in AustraliaТs Senate.а See
ibid., p. 27 and Harvey Cox, Making Votes Count (Cambridge University
Press, 1997), pp. 92-93, 143-144.
[2] An alternative electoral system
for the Chamber ofа Deputies is the
УPersonalized PRФ system used in various European countries.аа See Taagepera & Shugart, p. 35.