I.а Introduction
M |
aking Votes Count is the title of
a book by Gary Cox, a leading expert on electoral systems.[1] Here I shall
try to simplify his mathematically oriented research by paraphrasing and
reorganizing statements scattered throughout his study of 77 countries listed
by Freedom House as having democratic elections (circa 1992).аа
ааааааааааа Although Professor Cox
does not put it this way, a countryТs electoral system can be decisive for its
character, for it may determine Who
shall rule and for what Ends or
purposes.а Which means that the caliber
of politicians and the goals and policies they pursue depend very much on the
method by which they are elected.а The
method of election determines the relationship between citizens and office-holders,
hence the extent to which a country approximates a representative
democracy.а As will be seen in a moment,
an ostensibly democratic electoral system can enable the ruling political party
or parties to ignore the concerns of most citizens between
elections and thereby make a mockery of democracy.а
ааааааааааа Such is the case in
Israel.а Accordingly, the ultimate
purpose of this article is to provide a set of ideas regarding electoral
systems by which to understand and possibly correct the defects of IsraelТs
method of electing its parliament.аа
This is not to say that electoral or institutional defects alone are
responsible for the failings of Israeli democracy.а No less significant is the character of Israeli society and the
number of its political parties.
II. Social Structure and Electoral Systems
T |
he number of parties in a
country may be saidаа toа beа
an interactiveа functionа ofа
itsа electoral
systemа andа itsа
socialа structure.ааааа Heterogeneous
societies are likely to have more political partiesа than homogeneous societies, but the number
will be affected by the electoral system. Cox asks rhetorically:а УDoes anyone believe that the United States
would remain a two-party system, even if it adopted the Israeli electoral
system [where any party, receiving a mere 1.5% of the votes cast in Knesset
elections can obtain two seats in the legislature]?Ф
ааааааааааа Despite its great
ethnic, racial, and religious diversity, America has a two-party system
primarily because of its single-member districts with plurality rule.а This two-party system is a consequence
ofа Уstrategic voting.Фа Strategic voting means voting for a
higher-ranked candidate that one believes is stronger (and will win), rather
than for a lower-ranked candidate that one believes is weaker (and will lose),
even though you identify with the latter.аа
This is why simple plurality elections on the national, as opposed to
the local, level tends to eliminate third parties.аа An exception is Canada, which has simple plurality elections yet
a long-standing multiparty system.а In
this case social cleavages prove to be more significant than the electoral
system.
ааааааааааа Turning to Israel, this
country has less ethnic diversity than the United States.а Yet Israel has a more than ten-party system
precisely because the entire country constitutes a single electoral
district and parties win seats on the basis of proportional
representation.а A bit more than three
million votes were cast in the 1996 Knesset election; but given a 1.5%
threshold, 45,000 votes were enough for a party to win two seats!а No wonder 21 parties competed in that
election.а (Eleven won seats, and of
these eight formed the Netanyahu Government -- hardly conducive to the
formulation of coherent and resolute national policies.)а Not that this number of parties represents
significant social cleavages.а Even
IsraelТs taxi drivers have formed a party, trying (in vain) to win seats in the
Knesset!
ааааааааааа Of course, socially
defined groups will not always be able to form political parties.а Not all social cleavages become politicized,
and even fewer become УparticizedФ (i.e. form important lines of partisan
division).аа On the other hand, it can
be shown that different electoral systems can produce different party
systems, even when used in the same society at the same time!а A case in point is Australia, whose House of
Representatives is based on single member districts, but whose Senate is based
on multimember districts.а The House had
three parties in 1990, while the Senate had five.
ааааааааааа If one looks at the
national rather than at the local level, then of 77 countries having democratic
elections, 25 (including New Zealand, Great Britain, and the United States) use
electoral systems with single-member districts and plurality rule.а Although one can hardly recommend plurality
rule in single-member districts for Israel, I dare say it would be preferable
to the existing system of at-large elections with fixed party lists.а Since their rank on the list depends on
their party, Knesset members are accountable not to the voters but to their
party leaders.а The result is party
dictatorship, which tends to lower the quality of politicians and of public
life.аа To be sure, small parties in
Israel would be at a disadvantage under plurality rule with single-member
districts.а But they along with the entire
country suffer under coalition cabinet government, i.e., when the cabinet
consists of a multiplicity of parties incapable of pursuing a coherent and
resolute national strategy essential to IsraelТs security.а
ааааааааааа On the other hand, and
contrary to the view of most political scientists, plurality rule in
single-member districts does not necessarily underrepresent small parties.а All depends on the geographic distribution
of voters.а If a third partyТs voters
are concentrated in a particular region of the country, it may be able to
compete successfully as one of the two main parties locally, even while
remaining a third party nationally.а
Again, virtually any system of district or constituency elections is
preferable to fixed party lists.
ааааааааааа In fact, 74 out of 77
countries rely exclusively on districts elections for the lower (or only)
branch of their legislature.а The two
exceptions besides Israel are the Netherlands and Namibia.а The Netherlands, however, is a homogeneous
country where the Dutch constitute 96% of the population.а As for Namibia, it has a population of only
1,727,000.а
ааааааааааа Summing up, while the
number of parties in a country increases with the diversity of the social
structure and with the proportionality or permissiveness of the electoral system,
the two interact.а Increasing the
proportionality of an electoral system in a homogeneous society does not
proliferate parties, whereas it does in heterogeneous societies.а Similarly, increasing diversity of the
social structure in a non-proportional electoral system does not proliferate
parties, whereas it does in a proportional electoral system.аа Stated another way:а A country will have many parties only if it both
has many social cleavages and has a permissive enough electoral system to allow
political entrepreneurs to base separate parties on those cleavages.аа Conversely, a country can have few parties
either because it has no need for many (having few social cleavages) or poor
opportunities to create many parties because of a strong electoral system (such
as that of simple plurality rule).
ааааааааааа
III.а Voting for Candidates
and/or Party Lists
A |
s indicated above, the voters of
different countries, and even of the same country, have different ways to
vote.а In a single-ballot system the voters
vote just once.а In multiballot systems
two or more rounds of voting may be entailed.а
(In many countries a run-off election is required when no candidate
receives a majority of votes cast in the initial ballot.)
ааааааааааа Sometimes citizens vote
for candidates only, sometimes for party lists only, and sometimes they have
the option to do either or both.а The
number of candidate votes (i.e., votes cast for individual
candidates) each voter possesses can range from one to the total number of
candidates competing.аа The same holds
for the number of list votes each voter possesses.
ааааааааааа An exclusive candidate
vote is one that benefits only the candidate for whom it is cast, and never
transfers to any other vote total that is used for seat allocation.а Single exclusive votes are cast in
Anglo-American single-member districts as well as in Antigua and India.
ааааааааааа A nonexclusive
candidate vote, in addition to appearing in the vote total for the candidate
for whom it is cast, also affects other vote totals used in the allocation of
legislative seats.аа There are three
main types of nonexclusive vote in current use:а (1) the transferable vote, which transfers to the vote total of
another candidate; (2) the pooling vote, which transfers to the vote total of
the party list to which the candidate originally voted for belongs; and (3) the
fused vote, which simultaneously affects the vote totals of candidates running
for two or more different offices.
ааааааааааа (1) The transferable
vote system, also called the УPreferential Vote,Ф is used in Australia,
Ireland, Malta, Cambridge, Massachusetts, and elsewhere.а Here is how it works for AustraliaТs House
of Representatives:а As in single-member
plurality elections used in the United States and Great Britain, elections are
held in single-member districts, but the voter is required to rank ALL
candidates seeking election, from first to last.а УThe returning officer first sorts the ballot papers according to
which candidate is ranked first.а If at
this stage any one candidate has a majority of the votes, he or she is declared
elected.а Otherwise, the candidate with
the fewest first-place preferences is declared defeated.а The returning office then transfers the
votes of the defeated candidateТs supporters to whichever of the remaining
candidates they have marked as their next preference, again checking to see if
any candidate has achieved a majority of all the votes.а This process continues until some candidate
does attain a majority, whereupon he or she is declared elected.Ф
ааааааааааа Of relevance to Israel,
the Preferential Vote system Уallows small parties to document their
contribution to a large partyТs success.а
It is thus possible, even for parties that virtually never win seats on
their own, to play a significant role.Фа
In fact, by issuing Уhow to vote cards,Ф urging its supporters to adopt
a particular ranking of candidates below first, a minor party can be
instrumental in deciding which major party shall head the government!
ааааааааааа (2)а The pooling vote system, used in Finland and
Poland, may also be relevant to Israel.а
Here is how it works in Finland:аа
Voters cast their votes for individual candidates.а Once cast, however, these votes are
Уpooled,Ф since candidates join together in party lists. Parliamentary seats
are allocated to lists before they are allocated to candidates,
on the basis of list vote totals arrived at by summing the votes
of all candidates within the list.а
Notice, however, that in Finland, unlike in Israel, party lists are not
fixed, since the voters vote for individual candidates.а But whether a particular candidate will be
elected depends on the vote totals of his partyТs list as well as on the vote
totals of other candidates on that list.а
ааааааааааа (3)а By a fused vote, used in
Uruguay, Bolivia, and Honduras, voters cast a single vote for a slate that
includes candidates for the presidency as well as candidates for the Senate and
the lower house.а Split-ticket voting --
supporting one partyТs presidential candidate while voting for anotherТs
congressional candidates (as in the U.S.) -- is thus not possible.
ааааааааааа Split-ticket voting was
made possible in Israel in 1996 when, for the first time, the prime minister
was directly elected by the people.а
Citizens could then vote for one partyТs candidate for prime minister
while voting for another partyТs candidates for the Knesset.а This is precisely why the religious parties
won 23 seats in that election, seven more than in the previous 1992 Knesset
election.а (Hitherto, many voters, who
identified with Shas or Mafdal, cast their votes for the Likud because they did
not want Labor to win, either because of its secular orientation or
land-for-peace policy.)а What is
astonishing, and what attests to the poor quality of higher education in
Israel, is that Labor MK Yossi Beilin, a political scientist, advocated popular
election of the Prime Minister in the belief that it would diminish the power
of the religious parties!аа
ааааааааааа Now he and others (such
as Likud MK Yitzhak Shamir) want to resurrect the old system, when the head of
the plurality party in the Knesset formed the Government.а And they conceal this effort to diminish the
power of the religious parties under the facade that the old method of electing
the prime minister will restore institutional Уchecks and balances.Ф[2]а Admittedly, 61 votes (an absolute majority
of the Knesset) are now required to topple the Government by a vote of
no-confidence, whereas under the previous system, any simple majority
could overturn the Government.а But the
truth is that the Knesset has never overturned the Government on a vote of
no-confidence, unless it was the 1990 government of national unity, when, in a
bid for power (which failed), Labor chairman Shimon Peres persuaded SHAS to
desert the national coalition!а But
this, only in passing.аа
was the 1990 government of national unity, when, in a bid for power
(which failed), Labor chairman Shimon Peres persuaded SHAS to desert the
national coalition!а But this, only in
passing.
ааааааааааа There are, of
course, many problems attending district elections (which do not deter the 74
countries that have them).а Space
permits only a brief summary.аа One
problem usually associated with district elections is gerrymandering.а The Single Transfer Vote System
(STV) used for electing AustraliaТs Senate precludes this problem.[3]а To digress for a moment, STV may be ideal
for Israel since it involves preferential voting and proportional
representation (PR) in multi-member districts.а
Of course PR requires an electoral threshold.а Contrast IsraelТs 1.5% threshold with that of other countries.а In Argentina, only parties whose votes
exceed 3% of the number of registered electorate are eligible to receive
seats.а In Greece, only lists that get
at least 3% of the national vote are eligible to receive seats in districts
having more than two representatives.а
In Sweden a party must either exceed 4% of the national vote or its list
in the constituency must exceed 12% of the constituency vote.а GermanyТs 5% threshold is exceeded by little
LiechtensteinТs threshold of 8%.а
Finally, in some countries, such as the Czech Republic and Slovakia,
joint lists face higher threshold requirements than single-party lists.
ааааааааааа Needless to say,
district elections generate local parties.а
How these would relate to national parties in Israel is
problematic.а Since a winner-take-all
election for the premiership tends to generate a national two-party system,
over the years a two-party system on the national level may diminish the number
of parties on the local level.а Much will
depend on campaign financing laws, distinctive sectional interests, civic
education and the felt sense of national priorities.а
ааааааааааа District elections
obviously entail decentralization of power.а
Also, district elections, especially with residency requirements, strengthens
the Уrepresentational bondФ between parliamentarians and voters.а Although this would make a Knesset Member
(MK) more dependent on his constituents, it would also enable him to establish
a local power base that would render him more independent of the national
party.а He could then resist government
policies he deems unwise or pernicious without committing political suicide --
the lot of MKs today.а What this means is
that a legislator, in deciding how to vote on a particular issue, will be able
to make a balanced judgment between the views of his constituents, the position
of his party, and what he himself deems right or expedient.
ааааааааааа Moreover, the
independence Knesset Members gain from district elections will enable that body
to exercise the vital function of administrative oversight.а Precisely because fixed party lists
transform would-be legislators into apparatchiks, MKs lack the wherewithal to
scrutinize the bureaucracy headed by their party bosses, the ministers of the
cabinet.а This is why the annual State
Comptroller Reports are replete with evidence of official corruption and of
violations of the law, only to be swept under the rug by the Knesset.а But this means that ordinary citizens have
no outlet or effective spokesman for the redress of their grievances.а It means that dishonesty and injustice
persist without remedy.а But this makes
Israeli democracy a sham.а Without some
form of district elections, representative democracy is virtually impossible.[4]
IV. аRepresentative Democracy
R |
epresentation is often defined as having
oneТs views reflected in the legislative decision-making process.а Representation may also be defined as having
oneТs views reflected in actually enacted policies of government.а The first raises the question:а How well does the electoral system enable
the national electorate to impress its opinions on the legislature?а The second raises the question:а How well does the actually executed policies
of the government represent the opinions of the national electorate?
ааааааааааа We have seen that
IsraelТs system of at-large elections with fixed party lists renders Knesset
Members relatively independent of the voters between elections.а Stated more cautiously, let us say that the
Уrepresentational bondФ between MKs and citizens is weak.а Much the same may be said of cabinet
ministers, since the latter, with rare exceptions, are Knesset Members.а It follows that IsraelТs method of electing
the Knesset does not enable the national electorate to impress its opinions
effectively on the legislative process nor on the
actually executed policies of the government.а This is hardly consistent with representative democracy.
ааааааааааа If Israel had some form
of district elections, whereby citizens could vote for individual candidates rather
than for fixed party lists, the representational bond between Knesset Members
and constituents would be relatively strong.а
The national electorate would thus be better capable of impressing its
opinions both on the Knesset and on actually enacted government policies.а (Notice how President Bill Clinton, a
Democrat, adopted conservative policies after the Republican Party gained
control of both houses of Congress after the 1994 midterm election.а In fact, Clinton won the 1996 presidential
election because he very much campaigned on the party platform of his
Republican opponent!)
ааааааааааа Needless to say,
citizens can most effectively impress their opinions on candidates during
election campaigns, when office-seekers solicit their votes.а Analysis of public opinion polls tells
candidates what to say and what not to say during the campaign.а The trouble begins after the election, when
successful candidates assume office and proceed to formulate and execute public
policies.а For various reasons, good and
bad, politicians sometimes pursue policies that contradict their campaign
promises or their partyТs platform on certain public issues.а Although this is true in Israel as in the
United States, the issues concerning the countries are, in certain respects,
fundamentally different.а It is one
thing for politicians to renege on promises not to raise taxes or to increase
expenditures for this or that social service.аа
It is quite another thing for politicians to violate campaign pledges
concerning the very borders and capital of the state, and, by so doing, trample
on the historical convictions and aspirations of their people.а IsraelТs parliamentary electoral system
facilitates such betrayal (which is not to say it is the sole cause).
ааааааааааа For example, in
professional and neutrally organized polls conducted shortly before the June
1992 Knesset elections, 55% of Israel's Jewish population -- excluding
the 150,000 residents of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza -- believed that
these areas ought to "remain under Israeli rule, even if this meant
hindering the peace process."а Only
33% favored Labor's policy of "land for peace."[5]а It should be noted, however, that some
400,000 new immigrants from Russia were included in the poll.а The vast majority of these immigrants were
secularists with little knowledge of, or attachment to, the land of
Israel.а A large majority of these
immigrants voted for the Labor and Meretz parties in the hope that a Labor-led
government pursuing a Уland for peaceФ policy would obtain the ten billion
dollar U.S. loan guarantee intended to alleviate their economic plight.а Three years later (and wiser) they formed
the Yisrael BeТAliya party.а The
party won seven Knesset seats in the May 1996 elections and joined the
Government of Benjamin Netanyahu who opposed the Уland for peaceФ policy.а It is fair to assume, therefore, that that
policy violated the informed judgment of far more than 55% of IsraelТs Jewish
population, hence, that far less than 33%, for whatever reasons,
supported that policy.
ааааааааааа Inasmuch as Jewish citizens
residing in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza were expected to vote in the June 1992
Knesset election, thereby augmenting the 55% majority that opposed LaborТs
land-for-peace policy, it surprised no one that Labor chairman Yitzhak Rabin
promised the voters he would not negotiate with the PLO.а Once ensconced in office, however, Labor
proceeded to betray its pledge to the nation.а
Secret talks were held with PLO spokesmen (in violation of Section 4(h)
of the Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance of August 5, 1986 which prohibited
such contacts and which was not rescinded until January 1993.)[6]а It is in this light that we are to
understand the Israel-PLO Declaration of Principles of September 13, 1993
commonly known as the Oslo Agreement.аа
ааааааааааа A more blatant example
of the Labor GovernmentТs contempt for Jewish public opinion is the
following.а In various 1992 pre-election
polls, an overwhelming majority of 80 to 90% opposed any withdrawal from the
Golan Heights.а Accordingly, the Labor
Party's official platform proclaimed:а
"Israel sees in the Golan Heights an area of great importance for
its security, its safety and the ensuring of its water resources, even in
times of peace.а Consequently,
in every peace agreement with Syria and in the security arrangements, Israel's
settlements and military control will be maintained on the Heights --
on which Israel's jurisdiction, law and administration have been applied."[7] Rabin himself
declared to a Golan audience:а "As
for the future, it is inconceivable that even in peacetime we should go down
from the Golan.а Whoever even thinks of
leaving the Golan wantonly abandons the security of Israel."[8] Nevertheless,
Mr. Rabin betrayed his pledge to the nation once he became Prime Minister.а He publicly proclaimed his willingness to
withdraw from the Golan Heights in exchange for a peace agreement with Syria.
ааааааааааа Here it needs to be
remembered that, in 1992, the Labor-Meretz coalition received only 56 seats in
the Knesset, whereas the nationalist and religious parties received 59
seats.а Labor could not have formed a
government without the two Arab parties which together won 5 seats.а It should be obvious, therefore, that the
Labor Party lied its way into power and enacted a policy utterly contrary to overwhelming
public opinion.а In fact, given the
radically secular and anti-Zionist orientation of the Rabin Government -- which
blatantly deleted the words УJudaism and ZionismФ from the Soldiers Code of
Ethics (!) -- it is no exaggeration to say that 1992 witnessed an electoral coup
dТetat, not to say a political revolution, in Israel.
ааааааааааа Regarding the Oslo
Agreement, and ignoring the fact that its having been signed on the White House
lawn overawed public opinion in Israel, the Knesset УratifiedФ that fait
accompli.а I now ask:а Could Oslo have occurred in the first place
if members of the Knesset were accountable to the voters in district
elections?аа Of course politicians can
deceive voters in district as well as in at-large elections.аа But when a politician does not have to
campaign for reelection, having been assured of a safe place on his partyТs
list, he need be, and will be, less concerned about public opinion.а Conversely, if a politician supports a
policy he opposed during his campaign for office in a district or local
election, the voters will be reminded of his inconsistency by his political
opponent.а This would often deter
politicians from reneging on campaign promises, at least in districts having
closely contested elections.а Surely
this applies to politicians whose campaign promises involves such fundamental
issues as the borders and capital of the state.а
ааааааааааа To clinch the argument,
Mr. Netanyahu won the May 1996 prime ministerial election (the first direct
popular election of the primeа minister
in IsraelТs history).а True he won by a mere
0.5% margin over Labor chairman Shimon Peres.а
But here it should be borne in mind that Mr. PeresТs party has ever
dominated the media as well as IsraelТs economic and educational institutions.аа Despite this, Mr. Netanyahu receivedа 55.6% of the Jewish vote, a landslide
victory by American standards.а
Moreover, his Likud Party and coalition partners received 56% of the
popular vote giving them 68 seats in the Knesset.а To be sure, his coalition partners are not equally opposed to the
policy of Уland for peace,Ф primarily because they differ as to the strategic
and/or religious significance of different parts of Eretz Yisrael.а Nevertheless, it is clear that the majority
that opposed the policy of Уland for peaceФ in 1992 was intact in 1996.а Contrary to his known opposition to that
policy, however, Mr. Netanyahu proceeded to implement Oslo.[9]
ааааааааааа Netanyahu would never
have won the 1996 election if the electorate had any intimation that he would
not only implement Oslo, but sign an agreement -- the Wye Memorandum -- which
makes Arab compliance depend on the CIA and thereby surrenders IsraelТs
sovereignty to the United States.
ааааааааааа Although initial polls
indicated that more than 70% of the public supported the Wye agreement -- did
any potentially ruling party offer an alternative? -- nevertheless, the vast
majority expressed skepticism regarding Arab compliance.а This skepticism is symptomatic of the
unrepresentative character of IsraelТs political system.а For if Israel had direct popular election of
the Knesset -- hence of cabinet ministers -- public skepticism about the Arabs
would have precluded the Wye Memorandum, or produced an agreement more
favorable to Israel, or at least render its ratification far more difficult.
ааааааааааа That Mr. Netanyahu felt
compelled to continue LaborТs Oslovian policy is irrelevant to the argument of
this paper.а Presented here is solid
evidence that the absence of district elections in Israel produced Oslo, hence
Wye.а I will go further.а Shimon Peres was the driving force behind
Oslo.а What is remarkable is that even
though Mr. Peres has never won an election, this septuagenarian is still in the
Knesset!а I dare say he would have been
returned to private life long ago if Israel had district elections. The same
may be said of the late and lamented Yitzhak Rabin.а Therein is the consequence and tragedy of a rigid and basically
undemocratic political system.а Fixed
party lists entails self-perpetuating oligarchy.а It is a major cause of IsraelТs malaise.
Conclusion
S |
ince district elections would
augment the power of the people and diminish that of the parties, to expect
IsraelТs existing parties to support district elections is like asking chickens
to vote for Colonel Saunders.а It follows
that only a new party emerging from a powerful grass roots movement could
possibly bring about this most needed kind of electoral reform.а Studies indicate that an increasing majority
of the people favor such reform.а Until
such reform takes place, Israelis will vote but their votes will not count!
[1]Making Count:а Strategic Coordination in the WorldТs
Electoral Systems
(Cambridge University Press, 1997.)
[2]The position of
Abba Eban in УA disastrous process,Ф Jerusalem Post, July 10, 1998, p.
8.а He there states: УThe direct
election of the prime minister has violated every principle of decent
international order.Фа A remarkable non
sequitur.а Eban even has the
audacity to declare that so long as direct, popular election ofа the prime minister prevails, УIsrael will
have no right to call itself a democracyФ!
а
[3]See Paul Eidelberg, УWhy Israel
Needs a Constitution,Ф International Journal of Statesmanship (Los
Angeles:а Foundation for
Constitutional Democracy, April 1996), Vol. 1, No. 1.
[4]One exception, the Netherlands,
is a constitutional monarchy.ааа
[6]It is now well knownа that members of the Labor Party had been
meeting secretly with the PLO in Cairo as well as in London since 1989.а See Joel Bainerman and Barry Chamish,
"The Peres Gambit," National Review, March 7, 1994.
[7]Jerusalem Post, July 31, 1992, p. 6 (emphasis
added).
[8]Jerusalem Post, Dec. 3, 1993, p. 6.
[9]His claim that Israel was legally
obliged to abide by the Israel-PLO Agreement will not stand the test of
critical analysis, and for various reasons:а
first because a strong argument can be made, which a statesman could
rely upon, that the agreement was illegal ab initio; second because no
agreement is binding if it threatens the security and existence of oneТs
country; third because the agreement was repeatedly violated by the PLO prior
to Mr. NetanyahuТs election.